Goldenfreude? how about Bankenfreude

Cheer if you will Goldbug bashers, but I suspect if Gold starts another swan dive, it won't be alone.  There may even come a time when you wish Gold would rise.

"Triumphalism," Paul Krugman opined in a 1997 New Republic article, "presents its own problems." Under the, dare I suggest, ironic headline, Superiority Complex, Mr. Krugman completed his thought: " though the "American model" has scored some important successes, it continues to fail in other respects, above all in generating an ever-increasing level of inequality. And we won't begin to address those failures if the national mood remains dominated by self-congratulation." He closed the article with sage advice for his readers: "The truth is that nothing in the experience of the last few years contradicts the idea that we could have a kinder, gentler economy that preserves the main virtue of the American system--high employment. All it would take is compassion. And a little less gloating."

Compassion, and a little less gloating might also help Mr. Krugman understand, rather than mock, Goldbugs- a label which, contra Krugman's caricature thereof, denotes a group exhibiting a very wide range of economic/investment views- while they are nursing their recently suffered monetary wounds. I imagine for every gold hoardin', gun totin', doomsday preppin' angry white male proclaiming the end of the world (they annoy me too),there's at least one confused, upset and perhaps unemployed person who's fed up with Wall Street's "head's I win, tails you lose" investment strategy, (or one, like myself, who believes structural reform-blocking rigidities in the developed world won't be overcome easily leaving only 2 eventual paths for excess liquidity, inflation or default). Those confused and unsettled Goldbugs, having witnessed a succession of bursting investment bubbles at home and more recently read about bank runs abroad might, not without justification, have decided to save in Gold, rather than a bank, or his mattress.

Mr. Krugman, alas, is not gloating alone over Goldbug's recent misfortunes. One clever soul coined the term Goldenfreude to describe his state of mind. Joe Weisenthal proclaims, EVERYONE Should Be Thrilled By The Gold Crash- a view echoed by Felix Salmon. Barry Ritholtz leavened his disdain for Goldbuggery with a sliver of compassion, I do not want to engage in Goldenfreude — the delight in gold bugs’ collective pain — but I am compelled to point out how basic flaws in their belief system has led them to this place where they are today. Gold, he avers, has no fundamentals and those who buy are engaging in the ultimate greater fool trade.

While living in SE Asia during their late 90s crisis I witnessed first hand one of Gold's great virtues- when a nation's banking system, and almost always coincidentally, currency, comes under pressure Gold holds its value. The haircut recently forced on Cypriot savers was far less than that inflicted on Gold by the market. In other words, despite recent declines I'd rather be holding Gold in Cyprus than waiting in an ATM line to withdraw my daily allotment of currency.

America, the gloaters might retort, is not Cyprus. No, it isn't, and I (casting off one aspect of Krugman's Goldbug caricature) sincerely hope we don't find ourselves in their financial straits. My bet is that such can only be avoided by further monetization AND, in the absence of rapid real sector productivity gains which don't exacerbate income inequality induced domestic tensions (unlikely given right wing intransigence on welfare state expansion or a domestic Modest Proposal a la Swift), wage and price inflation.

"A ha," Krugman, beating his gloating compatriots to the punch, would likely argue, "you Goldbugs are always talking about runaway inflation. Didn't you read my recent article mocking your inflation worries thusly: "But the runaway inflation that was supposed to follow reckless money-printing — inflation that the usual suspects have been declaring imminent for four years and more — keeps not happening."

I agree, and the absence of broad based inflation given the stimulus in an environment of limited structural reform outside the developing world is my concern. I suspect if Mr. Krugman would stop gloating, it might be his too (more on this below).  If the recent decline in Gold signals, as many gleefully hope, a decline in inflation expectations, might the US, and, I suspect, other mature industrial economies (Europe and Japan) be drawing ever nearer to a stall in growth followed by a liquidity crunch?

Consider this potential catalyst for the Gold crash. "Macroeconomic stimulus," said a US Treasury FX Report chiding Japan for the recent, now reversed, Yen slide, "...cannot be a substitute for structural reform that raises productivity and trend growth." We'll return to structural reform momentarily after a look at market reaction. The Yen's rapid recovery following this report's release was coincident with the Gold crash- perhaps both price adjustments represent market belief that inflation games (currency debasement either externally or internally) won't be tolerated.  With austerity the rage in European policy circles (we aren't far behind in that regard, thanks to the Republicans), competitive devaluation verboten and Gold signalling, to the cheers of many, declining inflation expectations, I'd be surprised if yet another liquidity crunch isn't around the corner.

Factors Behind the Forecast:  Structural Rigidities and Over-Leveraged Finance

Despite recent record profits, the US financial system, still dependent on a few highly leveraged (how else to achieve such profits in a low interest rate environment) TBTF banks, is far from stable. Many mortgaged home-owners are still looking up at the zero-equity line. Those cheering the absence of inflation simply, it seems to me, because such makes Goldbugs look stupid, might want to consider that in a highly leveraged economy, the cascading defaults of deflation- the "it" Bernanke assured us wouldn't happen here- always loom in the background.

Cheer if you will Goldbug bashers, but I suspect if Gold takes another swan dive, it won't be alone. As we've seen over the past few days, Gold price declines are mirrored to various degrees by oil, other commodities, and equities. Declining prices, if such becomes the trend, will lead to higher unemployment and, amplified by the former, declining house prices and rising foreclosures. In the teeth of such an event, some might be yearning for the days when Gold was rising and inflation was assumed. I'll admit, such a scenario favors the dollars-saved-in-a-mattress strategy rather than Gold ownership but both tactics are anti-investments ridiculed by Goldbug bashers.

The elephant in the room for the Goldenfreuders is the lack of structural reform in the developed world- an omission perhaps due to a focus on high frequency and exclusion of low frequency economic factors. Structural reform, for those unfamiliar, refers to changes in the capital structure (factories, transport systems, education programs, agricultural methods, etc.) that hope to produce more for less. China's rapid economic growth over recent decades is, in large part, an effect of these reforms such as the shift, in 1978, from communal to industrial farming.

Significant structural reforms are often resisted.  Consider the resistance some individuals display when asked to eat less, drink and smoke less, and exercise more.  Note, "when asked."  Change is much easier (but not guaranteed) when it's wanted.  Consider, for example, the rapid adoption of computers and cell phones.  I doubt even severe coercion could have done half as much in twice the time.  Fortunately the benefits of these new technologies were readily apparent and despite some resistance by, e.g., book store owners to Amazon, those individual losses were smaller than the aggregate productivity gain.  Those productivity gains created an environment where jobs were plentiful, further easing stress caused by the destruction economic creation usually entails- agriculturalists rarely coexist harmoniously with hunter gatherers but they produce more food per acre meaning, if the latter adapt to the new system, both groups can survive.

In cases when reform calls for the destruction of wealthy industries with government ties, substantial legal changes, or labor downtime and re-education for a significant portion of the work-force (especially in the absence of a decently funded welfare state), resistance can effectively block what would likely be widespread productivity gains.  Pre WWII rail transport in continental Europe seems a case on point.  International disagreements over railway standards and routes (an example of structural reform-blocking rigidities) kept the continent from reaping the productivity gains a fully connected rail system promised- and delivered, after a devastating war cleared away both dissent and, sadly, large chunks of the old rail system.  Expanding on von Clausewitz for the modern world (which finds the more apt term, political-economy, too archaic) war is not just politics by other means but economics by other means- the worst means, in my view.

Structural reform-blocking rigidities are, in a sense, other words for productivity sapping rent seeking- e.g. from a bottom up perspective, Luddites breaking machinery or US autoworkers striking to avoid being replaced thereby, and from a top down perspective, trade barriers (tariffs) or de jure monopolies (Britain's BBC prior to 1955).  Profits and Investments in rent seeking industries, particularly when higher productivity methods are known and feasible, tend to be misdirected from entrepreneurial activity (why make a better or cheaper widget when it's cheaper to bribe a competition stifling official?).  Bribery doesn't seem to me a very economically productive activity although it obviously benefits some while irking others.

For an example of a structural rigidity overcome consider recent changes in US law which reduced regulations on where and how (think fracking) petroleum products can be extracted.  Fracking has changed N. Dakota from a deficit to a surplus state and driven unemployment to near zero.  Before you send me a nasty-gram, I'm not arguing such is an unalloyed good- insufficient profits are likely flowing to those who have been and certainly will be negatively affected (this is no environmentally neutral practice).  I'm merely pointing out the positive economic benefits thereof.

To digress for a moment, first with an apology to the economically literate for the rudimentary and likely (to some) unsatisfactory treatment of these issues and second with further explanation thereof: the ideological (and physical) battle between communism and capitalism over the past two centuries is the battle between productivity and people.  In my view, productivity is most effectively and durably enhanced at an imaginary "sweet spot" between radical laissez faire (think Ayn Rand) and communal ownership (Marx).  Transfer payments, whether private (charity) or public (government welfare) are, in my view, necessary to ensure social cooperation within the capitalist framework.  Domestic dissent is a sign that transfer payments are, whether as a result of insufficient funds or inefficient distribution, not performing their function.  Labor dissent in many developed economies (Occupy and austerity protests in America and Europe respectively) suggest to me a hopefully solvable but currently intractable transfer payment crisis.  The pendulum has swung too far right which isn't meant to obviate calls therefrom for greater transfer payment efficiency.

Cheers for the Gold crash sound to my ears like cheers for austerity in Europe and further dismantling of the welfare state in the US. If Japan needs inflation now, don't we as well? Perhaps we too should join the Euro? and give up our right to buy time with inflation?

I'll close with a look at another structural reform-blocking rigidity whose removal might justify a moment of schadenfreude. The phrase "Too Big To Fail" speaks to a de jure monopoly of sorts for those protected banks.  Potential competitors were blocked from taking over business which would have looked elsewhere for financial services absent government support.  Competition was stifled and the public debt increased.  I believe, but for delusional faith in the virtues of these institutions (more below), a less costly, competition enhancing solution could have emerged from the crisis of 2008 and resolving that rigidity would have eased tensions between labor and capital. 

Consider: Would current budget negotiations in the US be so contentious in the absence of the recent bail-out and additional debt incurred?

Returning to the delusion, TBTF banks remind me of Alchemists wasting labor and resources trying to turn lead into gold, or, more accurately, trying to squeeze more profit out of trade than trade generates.  Finance, at best, facilitates trade. In practice it records, analyses, calculates and communicates. What Amazon did to the local book merchant a similar company (or 5 or 20) can do even more effectively to finance.  Surely networked computing should decrease the cost of finance for the rest of the economy. 

On the bright side, the presence of rigidities suggests greater future productivity upon their resolution, although it would be tragic if such resolution comes via violence rather than diplomacy.  I believe a new cooperation enhancing agreement between labor and capital is possible.  Given the European example, I believe American energy efficiency can be increased.   As noted above, I believe American financial efficiency can be greatly enhanced through the dissolution of TBTF. 

When that happens I'll suggest a new word- Bankenfreude- and might even indulge in some myself.  I'll swap my Gold for currency and put it back in the game.  Until then, I'll remain a Goldbug.

Full disclosure (if it wasn't obvious) I own gold.

Is Paul Krugman an Efficient Marketeer?

Nor should you take seriously analysts claiming that we’re seeing the start of a run on all government debt. U.S. borrowing costs actually plunged on Thursday to their lowest level in months. And while worriers warned that Britain could be the next Greece, British rates also fell slightly. Paul Krugman, May 6, 2010

Not 12 months ago, Paul Krugman mocked Eugene Fama's Efficient Market Theory-based views on the Tech and Housing Markets via Larry Summers "ketchup economists" paper:

What this [Fama's tirade against the notion of "bubbles"] made me think of was an old paper by Larry Summers mocking finance economists as the equivalent of “ketchup economists”, who believe that they’ve demonstrated market efficiency by showing that two-quart bottles of ketchup always sell for twice the price of one-quart bottles.

Recently, however, as the opening paragraph (above) illustrates, Fama's efficient market theory- in brief (and without nuance): market prices quickly reflect all new information reasonably accurately- is now a sufficient basis from which to calm nerves over sovereign debt problems in the US and UK markets.

Perhaps Mr. Krugman doesn't like ketchup, tech stocks or houses, but does like cheap government debt issued by the US and UK (maybe that's where the Nobel prize money is invested?). Whatever the reason, Mr. Krugman can't have it both ways- either current market prices and recent reaction to news are not sufficient cause to dismiss "bubble" qualifications (which is my view) or they are (or there's an alternate theory which leads him to think US and UK debt is "safe" while Tech and Houses weren't).

If so, I'd love to read about it.

Given the recent kerfuffle between Mr. Sorkin and Mr. Krugman at the NYTimes over the nuances of Mr. Krugman's views on bank nationalization, I'm sure Mr. Krugman would argue I misread his meaning.  Maybe so.  Unlike, it seems, Mr. Krugman, I can understand how an author's intent wouldn't instantly manifest in a reader's mind (perhaps Krugman is an advocate of the efficient prose theory).

Your author meekly mining the economic press on a lovely Friday afternoon, signing off.

Helping the Fed Solve the Problem of Excess Reserves

The key to the game is your capital reserves. You don't have enough, you can't pee in the tall weeds with the big dogs. - Gordon Gekko

Ben Bernanke and the brain trust at the Federal Reserve have been working overtime trying to solve the problem of excess reserves in the US banking system. "How," they wonder, "can we drain these reserves from the system without destabilizing the markets?" Their fears of destabilizing markets are, I believe, justified, which seems odd given that the Fed, in the past, has been able to drain reserves, although the quantity drained was admittedly much smaller.

To the extent there is no way to drain these reserves without upsetting the markets the solution to the problem might not be one of action, but of thought. As Norman Vincent Peale said, "Change your thoughts and you change your world." Instead of trying to drain the excess reserves let's admit that they are not, in fact, "excess", but rather, "prudent", or even, as I suspect, "insufficient."

How do we determine if reserve levels are prudent, excess or insufficient? The determination is a process of thought. If financial assumptions about the future are perfectly accurate, there is no need of reserves- correctly valued assets will, under that head, always generate income sufficient to pay liabilities.

Reserves, then, are a safety measure in the event assumptions about the future are inaccurate- if assets are, in fact, not correctly valued. The more inaccurate prior assumptions of future events prove to be the wiser it would have been to increase reserves before the inaccuracies come to light.

The apparently resolved crisis in Greece seems a case in point (as, it seems to me, was the US crisis of 2008). The Greeks didn't simply decide, out of the blue, to borrow an additional 50 or 100 billion Euros, they, at certain levels of government, knew their fiscal position. Why then the crisis?

Simple. They made poor assumptions about either the value of their assets relative to liabilities (what economists call the primary fiscal balance) or the duration of the deceit which, in part, allowed them to borrow in sufficient quantities at favorable rates. In their case the latter seems more of an issue, as tends to be the case when crises "suddenly" manifest.

Like the homeowner who lied about his income to get a home or the Ponzi schemer who claims to own more than he does, the Greeks had been living on borrowed time. The question in that case about a crisis is not if but when.

Deceit, of course, is a loaded term as it connotes intent. Bernie Madoff is in jail because he admitted to such. In other instances a more appropriate phrase would be willfully ignorant. Those in charge hope for an outcome more objective, but equally educated persons deem unlikely, or impossible. Traders call this, talking your book.

Regardless of intent, the effects are the same. Reserves bridge the gap between projected and actual income relative to liabilities whether the gap is a function of deceit or ignorance (willful or otherwise). Sufficiently higher levels of reserves (other things equal) would have kept Mr. Madoff out of jail and obviated the Greek crisis.

Gordon Gekko had it right.

Returning to the issue du jour- the proper level of reserves in the US banking system- the difficulty of imagining a plausible future scenario with the reserves drained strongly suggests to me that current levels are minimally prudent. That is, if draining reserves would cause rates to rise, decrease real sector activity, or some combination thereof such that bank incomes wouldn't cover required payments then they shouldn't be drained.

Why then does the Fed seem so intent on draining? Perhaps they aren't as intent on draining them as some might think. Perhaps their intent is simply to maintain the illusion that the reserves are considered excess. If they told the world the level of reserves was considered prudent this would likely send a message that the financial state of US banks is not as healthy as otherwise advertised. This, in turn, might exacerbate future gaps between bank income and outflow, requiring even higher levels of reserves than currently exist, or, as was the case in Greece and with Mr. Madoff, precipitate a crisis.

Perhaps the only way to keep the real sector operating such that bank assets perform is to increasingly dilute the currency (since any increase in reserves would most likely be "borrowed" from the Fed as happened during the last crisis). Perhaps Mr. Kinsley's nightmare scenario of impending substantial inflation and even hyper-inflation is much nearer that truth than the Fed or Mr. Krugman would have us believe.  Perhaps the classification of reserves as excess has more to do with what the Fed wishes others (i.e. those who lend money to the US) to assume than what they assume, which edges ever closer to Greek deceit.

The Fed could, of course, prove me wrong by draining the reserves deemed to be in excess without precipitating a crisis.

I won't, however, be holding my breath.

The Kins(l)ey Report (on Inflation)

One could, in a debate of US inflation prospects, discuss the virtues of issuing the currency in which your debt is denominated, and the ability of US political leadership to enact tough change counter-balanced, I think, by the magnitude of the debt in question relative to world GDP, and the actual history of US political leadership to enact tough change. But my aim is not (in this essay) a reasoned debate but a notice of the lack thereof.


If, like me, you're an official member of the pajama wearing blogger corps, you might be familiar with the recent debate over US inflation prospects between Michael Kinsley and Paul Krugman, et. al. If not, here's Kinsley's initial article, Krugman's rebuttal, Kinsley's retort, and Krugman's rebuttal of the retort.

Krugman's second rebuttal dripped with condescension, or so it seemed to me, recalling memories of school yard bullies. Those memories tempted me to begin this article with a quip about Krugman needing to pick on someone his own size......, but I'll use a different metaphor.

"Ouch!," you might be thinking, "that's a bit cruel."

True.

So's this line from Krugman to Kinsley: "I’m tempted to get into an argument about whether it’s “bullying” to suggest that if you’re going to write about an economic issue, you might want to study it first. But what I really want to do is..."

Don't you love the artful use of the non-statement statement?

Aside from my belief that future events are more likely to follow some variation of Kinsley's nightmare scenario than Krugman's Japan model (about which, more here), the element of the exchange that inspired this post was Krugman's nasty dismissal of an apparently serious inquiry from one who apparently admires his views.

Kinsley's initial article contains statements like: "am I crazy?", "Every economist I admire, from Paul Krugman and Larry Summers on down, is convinced that inflation will remain low for as long as we can predict", "I can’t help feeling that the gold bugs are right", and "My fear is not the result of economic analysis. It’s more from the realm of psychology."

These are the words of a humble student searching for wisdom to quell his fears.

The wise Professor Krugman begins his rebuttal with: "Mike Kinsley has an odd piece in the Atlantic in which he confesses himself terrified about future inflation, even though there’s no hint of that problem in the real world."

You can almost see the sneering Professor holding up the student's paper in front of the class as you read the words (at least I could).

Using the tried and true nasty Professor trick of tossing about a bit of relevant jargon and a counter-example, Krugman expects Kinsley to slink back into his seat.

To his credit, Kinsley doesn't flinch.... much. He almost falls for the Professorial misdirection (debating whether a sudden 100% inflation shock is better than a Weimar hyper-inflation is like debating whether losing both legs is better than getting killed- I see your point, but I'll take none of the above) but then gets back on point, telling the Prof (in effect), "you didn't answer my question."

Why not inflation?

As Kinsley argued, the 70s demonstrated the US is not immune to inflation and Gold has risen from $275 to over $1000 during the past decade. Perhaps Kinsley's main confusion lies in his focus on the future tense, instead of seeing it as an ongoing issue.

Kinsley's search for the truth on inflation reminds me of Alfred Kinsey's search for truth on human sexual habits, which led to the publication of two books on human sexuality known collectively as the Kinsey Reports. Like Kinsley (or so it seems to me) Kinsey's search for truth battled with popular conceptions of what should (in some views) be, but wasn't.

In a sense Kinsey reported on what everyone (collectively) knew, but was afraid to say. The fear (perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, somewhat justified) among then current opinion shapers was, in part, that open discussion would release the genie from the bottle. Hugh Hefner, of Playboy fame, credits Kinsey with opening his eyes to human sexual experience.

Krugman, in my view, is too smart an economist to dismiss outright the possibility of another significant inflation episode in the US, which may or may not be followed by hyper-inflation.

To use his phrasing, for those dismissing prediction of substantial US inflation, what is it about the US now that looks different to you from Thailand, Korea and Indonesia in say, 1997 (or Russia in 1998, or Iceland just recently)? Substantial public and private sector debt? Check. Huge expansion in the monetary base? Check. Large external debts and ongoing external deficits? Check. Increasing difficulties rolling over ever shorter term debt? Check. And yet each of those countries suffered, not multi-year hyperinflation, admittedly, but a sudden substantial (50-100% or more) inflation shock.

There are, admittedly, differences. As I wrote, I was using his phrasing and argument form. One could debate the virtues of issuing the currency in which your debt is denominated, and the ability of US political leadership to enact tough change counter-balanced, I think, by the magnitude of the debt in question relative to world GDP, and the actual history of US political leadership to enact tough change. But my aim is not a reasoned debate but a notice of the lack thereof.

Mr. Krugman might snidely respond to my snidely put question that the issue was hyper-inflation. I lived in Asia during their crisis and such shocks are worth worrying about even if hyper-inflation is avoided (besides, his use of Japan- a nation which self-finances, which seems to me a critical distinction- as counter-point suggests even moderate inflation is unlikely). Moreover, as Kinsley notes, who knows what policy makers will opt to do when the next crisis erupts. The history of the Bernanke Fed is not one of monetary restraint in a time of crisis.

I suspect that Krugman, not the economist, but the opinion shaper is, like those Kinsey battled, trying to keep the genie in the bottle- thus the Professorial dismissal instead of reasoned discussion of the issue. Inflation has both psychological and real world causes- when the two unite, the fireworks begin.

Perhaps, in a limited fashion, the Kinsley Report on Inflation will have a similar effect as Kinsey's, (then again maybe both should be seen as catalyst instead of cause) by bringing the debate into the open.

I wonder who the Hugh Hefner of Inflation will prove to be- perhaps Bill Murphy of GATA?

My advice to Kinsley is to have the courage of his convictions and buy some Gold, the price of which may have been as suppressed as reasoned open debate on US inflation prospects appears to be- both actions aim at the same effect.  I did (at $275 for Krugman's information) and I'm still holding.